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ABSTRACT The objective of the research was to establish data relating to underlying causes of human 
error which are the most common cause of information security incidents within a private sector healthcare 
organisation. A survey questionnaire was designed to proactively apply the IS-CHEC information security 
human reliability analysis (HRA) technique. The IS-CHEC technique questionnaire identified the most 
likely core human error causes that could result in incidents, their likelihood, the most likely tasks that 
could be affected, suggested remedial and preventative measures, systems or processes that would be likely 
to be affected by human error and established the levels of risk exposure. The survey was operational from 
15th November 2018 to 15th December 2018. It achieved a response rate of 65% which equated to 485 of 
749 people targeted by the research. The research found that, in the case of this particular participating 
organisation, the application of the IS-CHEC technique through a questionnaire added beneficial value as 
an enhancement to a standard approach of holistic risk assessment. The research confirmed that IS-CHEC 
in questionnaire form can be successfully applied within a private sector healthcare organisation and also 
that a distributed approach for information security human error assessment can be successfully undertaken 
in order to add beneficial value. The results of this study indicate, from the questionnaire responses 
supplied by employees, that organisational focus on its people and their working environment can improve 
information security posture and reduce the likelihood of associated information security incidents through 
a reduction in human error.  
 
INDEX TERMS Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART), Human Error Related Information Security 
Incidents, Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), Information Security, IS-CHEC  
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is acknowledged that people play a crucial role in the 
security of information [1], which is the lifeblood of a 
company [2], and this is not just an IT problem [2]–[4]. Yet 
there continues to be varied understanding of the 
proportions of human error resulting in regular information 
security incidents and breaches [5], [6] and the level of risk 
exposure [7] which cannot be ignored [8] within the 
information security community encompassing both 
academia and industry.  
Komatsu, Takagi and Takemura [9] published results 
indicating rates of human error related to incidents was as 
low as 7.9% but an earlier dataset relating to 2005 suggested 
that human error was the largest category at 42%. Contrary 
to these figures, Lacey [10] stated that the majority of 
security incidents are caused by human factors and his 
research also presented that almost 90% of workplace 
accidents are caused by human failure. In addition Hals [11] 
stated that human error is the primary causal factor in 70%-
80% of accidents in the oil and gas industry suggesting that 
the information security community could learn from the 
safety field which is more established in this area [12]–[15].  
Other research presented that 24% of data loss incidents 
were caused by insiders including accidental and malicious 
acts [16], 55% of root causes of data breaches occurred as a 
result of unintentional employee action [17] and more than 
one-third of hospital communication errors were related to 
human factors. In addition, it is also published that most 
unintended and unanticipated errors are due to socio-
technical issues when using technologies [18] which is 
leading to the socio-technical nature of information security 
coming to the fore [19]. The Annual Information 
Governance Incident Trends (2015-2016) [20] presented 
that 77% of incidents were made up of disclosure in error, 
lost or stolen paperwork and unauthorised access/disclosure.  
The majority of reported information security incidents and 
breaches within organisations are as a result of human error 
[21], [22]. This was confirmed based upon an analysis of 
published incidents and breaches [23], [24]. Nonetheless, 
there is a lack of empirical information security research 
[19] regarding organisational theories. This lack of focus 
includes limited attention on the topic of human error and 
the affects it has on information security assurance and 
associated incidents and breaches as shown by the UK 
Government Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2019 [25]. 
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Despite there now being a common understanding that 
human error should be a primary focus within organisations, 
due to the risks that people pose [26], the survey [25] does 
not encompass this common non-technical concern unlike in 
previous surveys [27].  
This case study forms part of wider research where in our 
previous empirical research with public and private sector 
healthcare organisations we presented that that human 
reliability analysis (HRA) is applicable and beneficial [21], 
[22], [28] to an information security context. However, the 
developed and empirically validated [21], [22] Information 
Security Core Human Error Causes (IS-CHEC) information 
security HRA technique had so far only been used 
reactively in relation to reported information security 
incidents in healthcare.  As stated by Gu et al [29] human 
reliability should be extended to address the entire 
information security risk management function. There is 
currently no published information security HRA technique 
or method that is designed to proactively interact directly 
with employees in order to identify potential causes of 
human error which may result in an information security 
incident and the associated risk exposure.   
The approach taken in this article was to adapt the IS-CHEC 
technique [22] into survey questionnaire form and deploy it 
to enable the participating organisation to act upon the 
results whilst enhancing academic knowledge in this area. 
This included expanding upon the IS-CHEC analysis 
element [21] to enable quantification of risk based upon the 
participating organisations risk quantification mechanisms. 
In addition the IS-CHEC mapping element [21] was adapted 
to become a questionnaire data capture element capturing 
underlying human error cause data, the business area the 
employee works in and business processes involved in to 
obtain valuable contextual data.   
We distributed the IS-CHEC questionnaire to all operational 
personnel within a participating private sector healthcare 
organisation to obtain their views and opinions about the 
causes of human error, the tasks that would be most likely 
affected by human error and suggested preventative 
measures that would address the human error problem and 
resultant information security incidents.  
The results of the survey were then broken down into the 9 
distinct operational business areas of the participating 
organisation to allow a more granular understanding in 
terms of the perceived underlying causes of human error, 
the business processes most likely affected and the specific 
supporting tasks, such as updating systems or sending 
emails, that would be most susceptible to human error. 
Moreover, through mutual analysis of the survey 
questionnaire results with the respective Director or Head of 
each of the operational business areas the level of risk 
exposure was established based upon the classification of 
data being processed by each task and process, the 
established human error probability and automatically 
mapping these to the participating organisations risk 
quantification metrics. 
We also compared the results with each area’s incident 
trends and also a separate information security risk 
assessment that had been carried out within the previous 12 
months for each operational business area. The comparison 
was intended to identify the beneficial value of the 
questionnaire to the participating organisation as an 
enhancement to standard risk assessment undertaken by a 
dedicated information security employee. 
The survey was operational from 15th November 2018 to 
15th December 2018 and used Microsoft Office 365 Forms 
technology. It achieved a response rate of 65% which 
equated to 485 of 749 people targeted by the research.  
The motivation behind this case study was to obtain detailed 
data in relation to the causes of human error which has been 
proven to be the most common root cause of information 
security incidents within the participating healthcare 
organisation. The survey questionnaire was designed to 
proactively apply the IS-CHEC human reliability analysis 
technique that has proved to be successful when applied to 
incident management [21], [22]. The IS-CHEC technique 
questionnaire aimed to identify the following: 
• The most likely Core Human Error Causes 
(CHEC) that could result in incidents and their 
likelihood. 
• The most likely tasks (referred to as GISATs by 
the IS-CHEC technique) that could be affected by 
human error. 
• The suggested most important remedial and 
preventative measures (RPM) to address the human 
error concern. 
• Ascertain the systems or processes that would 
likely be affected by human error. 
• Establish the levels of risk exposure based upon the 
likelihood responses obtained and the impact of 
human error based on analysis with the 
participating organisation Directors and Heads of 
Service. Risk values also leverage the upper and 
lower bounds of tolerance of human error 
probability as set out within the Human Error 
Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) 
HRA technique.   
 
This paper makes the following contributions: 
• Conducts for the first time in literature dedicated 
empirical case study research within a participating 
healthcare organisation to establish employee 
perceptions of information security weaknesses 
related directly to human error 
• Converts, applies and evaluates the IS-CHEC 
technique in survey questionnaire form designed to 
proactively capture the causes of human error, the 
tasks that would be most likely affected and 
suggested remedial and preventative measures 
• Assessment of whether the calibrated IS-CHEC 
technique could be applied within a participating 
private sector healthcare organisation via 
distributed questionnaire and add beneficial value 
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when compared to standard security assessments 
performed by a security professional 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 details the associated related work including related 
information security work and associated literature. Section 
3 presents the research method including the case study 
participating organisation, the IS-CHEC questionnaire 
design and analysis approach. Section 4 presents the results 
of the questionnaire survey and comparison with 
independent information security risk assessment. Section 5 
presents the findings, implications, comparisons with the 
literature and any limitations of the method and technique. 
Finally section 6 captures the research conclusions. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Taniuchi [30] presented that human error is a deviation from 
required performance whereas Hals [11] presented a view 
that human error pertains to human actions that exceed a 
limit of acceptability. Werlinger, Hawkey and Beznosov 
[31] presented in their work that poor computer and 
information security is caused by non-deliberate accidental 
human actions. Reason [32] classified human errors in three 
categories. These classifications are defined [11] as a slip 
which is a correct action but a faulty execution, a lapse 
which is a lapse in memory or distraction causing a failed 
execution of a task, and a mistake which is defined as a 
correct execution of an incorrect intention. 
Hadlington et al [33] as part of their research into work 
identity and work locus of control and its relationship with 
information security awareness state that there has currently 
been limited success in mitigating the threat posed by 
accidental attempts to gain access to company data and 
systems. They also present that there is now a greater focus 
in the human aspects of information security and that 
technology cannot be the only solution. Notably they 
highlight that a greater understanding of why employees fail 
to adhere to the most basic information security principles is 
critically important to enable comprehensive frameworks to 
be developed.  In addition, they investigate the degree of 
work locus of control and conclude that employees having 
limited perceived control over their workplace environments 
were more likely to have weaker information security 
awareness.   
Compliance intention is defined as the intention of the 
employee to protect the information resources of the 
organisation from potential security breaches [34] and they 
tend to be disinterested if the benefit of information security 
compliance is not sufficient when compared to the cost. 
Veiga and Martins [35] argue that one of the most effective 
countermeasures against human factor threats to information 
security are awareness, training and education and that 
although there might be adequate technology and processes 
in place, employees might circumvent controls because of 
their perception or attitude towards information security 
policy. Cilliers [36] states the most common data breach 
still remains where employees that have access to or may 
copy information without authorisation. There are also a 
number of theories that have been published [16], [37] 
including deterrence theory (DT), theory of reasoned 
action/planned behaviour (TRA), protection motivation 
theory (PMT), rational choice theory (RCT), social 
cognitive theory (SCT), social bond theory (SBT), and 
neutralization theory (NT), which address modelling 
behaviour or behavioural change. However, all of these 
theories appear to focus upon intentional action and not 
address the prominent issue of unintentional human error. 
Hals [11] presented three human error causation paradigms 
which were the engineering error paradigm, individual error 
paradigm and organisational paradigm in their work. These 
paradigms look to identify the underlying causes of human 
error, which could be contributing factors of system failures 
[38] and are known as different terms including Core 
Human Error Cause (CHEC) [21], Error Producing 
Condition (EPC) [39] or Performance Shaping Factors 
(PSF) [40]. These terms form part of human reliability 
analysis (HRA) techniques and their goal is to assess the 
risks attributable to human error for ways of reducing 
system vulnerability [11]. In order to achieve this HRA goal 
the technique must achieve human error identification, 
human error quantification and human error reduction [11]. 
An example of a HRA technique is the Human Error 
Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART), which is 
based on the general principle that for each task in life there 
is a basic probability of failure [41]. The underlying causes 
of error could include humans being over or under-loaded as 
well as considering physical and mental task demands [42], 
[43] or social factors [44], which could indicate whether the 
environment makes it possible to exhibit or impact upon 
secure behaviour [45], [46]. 
As stated by Colwill [26], security assessments must take 
into account explicitly human behaviour. Questionnaires 
with a focus on the human factors have been established, 
validated and published previously. These include the 
Human Aspects of Information Security Questionnaire 
(HAIS-Q) [47], [48] and the Cyber Human Error 
Assessment Tool [49]. The HAIS-Q [47] employs a 
questionnaire comprising of 63 statements spanning 7 focus 
areas (Internet use, email use, social networking site use, 
password management, incident reporting, information 
handling and mobile computing) in order to measure 
employee information security knowledge, attitude and 
behaviour. The HAIS-Q questionnaire is broader than solely 
focussing upon human error as it also incorporates 
intentional conscious and/or malicious employee behaviour 
as well as the possibility for employees to be exploited by 
malicious third parties.  The CHEAT questionnaire [50] is 
specifically focussed upon cyber security human error using 
techniques such as HEART and was developed based upon 
previously published incident data. However, it was 
constrained by the lack of information in the public domain 
[50]. It comprises of 41 human factor indicators spanning 
into four categories (people, organisation, environment and 
technology).  
III. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participating Private Sector Organisation 
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The case study benefitted from a participating private sector 
organisation that provides healthcare services to the British 
National Health Service (NHS). They are a large service 
provider operating in the United Kingdom. It has 
approximately 1100 employees and provides a range of 
services. Its incident management practices are required to 
support compliance with international security standards 
such as the ISO27001 Standard, Cyber Essentials as well as 
the NHS Information Governance Toolkit [51]. Information 
security is governed centrally by the Senior Information 
Risk Owner and associated team who are responsible for the 
development of organisational strategy and policy. In 
addition, designated information security leads have 
responsibility for every business area to ensure full coverage 
and adherence. 
IS-CHEC Questionnaire Design 
The targeted survey questionnaire participants encompassed 
all of the 749 operational employees of the participating 
organisation. This incorporated all operational roles from 
the Head of each business area through to all operatives and 
there were no exclusions. Respondent participation was 
anonymous and therefore unable to be enforced for all 
personnel but was strongly encouraged and response rates 
monitored by management throughout the duration of the 
survey. To conduct research involving human participants, 
this research adhered to De Montfort University (DMU) 
ethical standards and guidelines, and has been approved by 
the DMU ethics committee (ref: 1516/325). Operational 
areas of the participating organisation were selected due 
previous empirical research [21] identifying that virtually all 
information security incidents related to operational areas of 
the business. In addition, the operational areas of the 
business had been subject to information security risk and 
compliance assessments over the previous 12 months which 
would enable comparison to be undertaken. The non-
operational areas of the business had low numbers of 
incidents which did not provide a reliable data set for 
comparison and also had not been subject to information 
security risk and compliance assessment which prevented 
comparison.     
The electronic questionnaire was designed to take no longer 
than 5 minutes to complete and focuses on capturing quality 
information easily from the user using the Microsoft Office 
365 Forms technology. It was intended to proactively use 
the IS-CHEC technique through distributed questionnaire 
and compare the results to an information security risk 
assessment undertaken by information security personnel 
independent of this research. The questionnaire obtained the 
likelihood element of the risk assessment approach. The 
impact will be applied by the Director or Head of each 
respective business area and researcher through 
understanding of the information assets associated with the 
business area and organisation’s systems or processes 
identified by employees as being vulnerable to human error. 
In order to encourage higher response rates a prize was 
offered for the participating organisation operational 
business area with the greatest response rate percentage. 
The questionnaire comprises of 16 questions which are 
presented in Table A1 in the appendices of this paper. These 
questions are comprise of 10 drop-down list questions, 3 
Likert scale questions, and 3 short answer text boxes. Six of 
the questions are mandatory and 10 are optional. The 
mandatory questions are made up of 4 drop-down list 
questions, 1 Likert scale question, and 1 short answer text 
box. The optional questions are made up of 6 drop-down list 
questions, 2 Likert scale questions, and 2 short answer text 
boxes. However, the questionnaire was designed to enable 
relevant questions to be skipped if a ‘not applicable’ 
response was provided for associated preceding questions.  
In addition the questionnaire drop-down list response 
options were automatically randomised to remove any bias 
in selection.  
The questionnaire had an introductory section prior to the 
16 questions (See Appendix A1), briefing the participants 
that their involvement is voluntary, the study will be 
conducted in an anonymous way and the benefits of 
participation.  
In order to ensure the questionnaire was fit for purpose prior 
to deployment a targeted multi-disciplinary pilot group of 
12 people was agreed to test and review the created IS-
CHEC questionnaire. Changes to the questionnaire were 
agreed by the Information Security Steering Group and 
applied based upon their feedback. The pilot group 
comprised of the participating organisation Information 
Security Team, Chief Operating Officer, Senior Information 
Risk Owner, Communications Team, Head of Risk 
Management and Compliance, Head of Clinical Governance 
and an independent proof reader. Due to the large number of 
CHECs available within the IS-CHEC technique it was felt 
by the participating organisation that this could be confusing 
and difficult for the respondents which could affect the 
overall response rate. Therefore a decision was taken to only 
use the CHECs that had been previously identified by the 
participating healthcare organisation and also those 
identified by the public sector healthcare organisation as 
part of the wider empirical study [21], [22]. These CHECs 
can be seen in Table 2. In addition the wording of the 
CHECs were reviewed and simplified to aid understanding 
of the questionnaire respondents which would enable faster 
completion and greater accuracy of responses. 
In order to conduct the empirical study, the IS-CHEC 
technique and tool was used as presented in our previous 
study within a private sector organisation [21]. The IS-
CHEC technique is an adapted version of the HEART HRA 
technique [39]. 
Analysis Method 
The analysis and computation of the findings was 
undertaken using an adaptation of the IS-CHEC mapping 
and analysis elements as published within previous articles 
[21], [22]. This enabled questionnaire data capture, 
repeatable practices, easy computation and reporting in 
accordance with the participating organisations risk 
appetite, risk framework and associated risk matrix based 
upon understanding of the probability and impact of a risk 
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event occurring. This was achieved through establishing the 
classification of the data processed by each organisation 
system or process and supporting tasks captured within the 
questionnaire responses. The classification could then be 
mapped to the organisation’s risk appetite standard and 
associated risk impact classifications. The HEART 
calculations were applied as part of the IS-CHEC analysis 
element to establish a nominal human error probability 
which could also be mapped to the organisation’s risk 
appetite standard and associated risk probability 
classifications. The capturing of both the risk impact and 
probability using the organisation’s own risk quantification 
mechanisms enabled accurate, understandable and 
automatic risk exposure quantification. The IS-CHEC 
questionnaire data capture and questionnaire analysis 
elements are presented in Tables A1 and A2 respectively 
which can be found within the appendices of this paper. 
In order to establish if the IS-CHEC questionnaire could add 
beneficial value, the results were split into each of the 9 
operational business areas within the participating 
organisation targeted by the questionnaire and subsequently 
compared to actual incidents experienced for each area. This 
paper presents the consolidated results for each area 
however a comprehensive and detailed report was compiled 
for the participating organisation at the conclusion of the 
survey to enable targeted action to be planned and 
undertaken. A detailed analysis was performed looking at 
incident root causes as well as the underpinning core human 
error causes where the incident had been determined to be 
as a result of human error by looking at core components of 
the IS-CHEC technique (CHEC, GISAT, RPM and System 
or Process). Results were subsequently compared to 
information security risk and compliance assessment reports 
undertaken independently of this research for each area. 
This comparison was undertaken to understand how close 
the IS-CHEC questionnaire results were to actual incident 
exposure in terms of identifying underlying vulnerabilities 
or weaknesses compared to a standard information security 
risk and compliance assessment undertaken by a large 
organisation as part of ISO27001 [52] compliance activity.   
IV. RESULTS 
As outlined earlier in the paper the questionnaire was active 
from 15th November 2018 to 15th December 2018. It 
achieved a response rate of 65% as presented in Table 1. 
This equated to 485 of 749 people targeted by the research. 
The average time taken to complete the questionnaire was 
13 minutes 30 seconds. The results were broken down by 
the 9 operational business areas of the participating 
organisation. The name of each business area has been 
redacted and replaced with a letter in order to protect the 
identity of the participating organisation. 
TABLE 1 
BUSINESS AREA RESPONSE RATES 
Business 
Area 
Count of 
Questionnaire 
Completions 
Count 
of 
Staff 
Percentage 
A 35 69 51% 
B 47 55 85% 
C 64 109 59% 
D 13 20 65% 
E 66 84 79% 
F 124 230 54% 
G 49 62 79% 
H 72 104 69% 
I 15 16 94% 
Total 485 749 65% 
 
The IS-CHEC questionnaire and the method outlined earlier 
identified that there were 26 of the responses that were 
quantified as having the highest possible risk score of 16 
based on the 4 (probability) x 4 (impact) risk matrix used by 
the participating organisation. These identified risks 
spanned across 6 of the 9 business areas. The participating 
organisation expressed that the results were useful as the 
respondents made it clear that there were particular 
organisational systems or processes that cause them the 
greatest concern in terms of its associated data and the effect 
of potential human error. 
The IS-CHEC technique questionnaire captures between 1-3 
CHECs, GISATs and suggested RPMs. Therefore the 
following text shows the captured results for the CHEC, 
GISAT and RPM components and then combines to provide 
a total count for each component. Any questionnaire 
response that had duplicate CHEC, GISAT or suggested 
preventative measure selected had the duplicates removed to 
ensure the accuracy of overall results for each IS-CHEC 
component.   
Generically across the participating organisation the 
responses showed clearly that the respondents felt they were 
being made to perform their work at a faster rate than they 
are comfortable with. 136 of the 485 respondents felt that 
this was the most likely cause of human error which equates 
to 28%. However, also taking into account the second and 
third most likely CHEC then this accounted for 223 
responses or 46%. The total responses related to the CHECs 
are presented in Table 2.  
TABLE 2 
TOTAL CHECS 
CHEC Most 
Likely 
CHEC 
Count 
2nd 
Most 
Likely 
CHEC 
Count 
3rd 
Most 
Likely 
CHEC 
Count 
Total 
Count 
CHEC36 - Pressure to work too 
fast 
136 57 30 223 
CHEC2 - A shortage of time 31 42 50 123 
CHEC16 - Inaccurate or 
incomplete information 
37 49 36 122 
CHEC29 - Stress 34 38 40 112 
CHEC15 - Operator 
inexperience 
23 46 39 108 
CHEC17 - Little or no checking 
or testing by another person 
15 31 29 75 
CHEC11 - Don't understand 
the policy, standards, process 
or procedures 
26 21 26 73 
CHEC9 - Learning a new 
technique, process, procedure 
or way of working 
17 29 26 72 
CHEC13 - System information 
communicated is inaccurate, 
unclear or inappropriate 
26 23 15 64 
CHEC34 - Inactivity or highly 
repetitious tasks 
18 22 22 62 
6	
	
CHEC Most 
Likely 
CHEC 
Count 
2nd 
Most 
Likely 
CHEC 
Count 
3rd 
Most 
Likely 
CHEC 
Count 
Total 
Count 
CHEC19 - Not enough 
information 
21 15 19 55 
CHEC6 - A misunderstanding 
between an operator and a 
designer of a procedure 
19 11 15 45 
CHEC28 - Unaware of the 
importance of your tasks to the 
wider service 
14 9 12 35 
CHEC39 - No self-checking or 
testing 
12 12 7 31 
CHEC7 - No way to undo an 
error 
6 12 10 28 
CHEC1 - Unfamiliarity due to 
infrequent or new situation 
14 3 10 27 
CHEC Most 
Likely 
CHEC 
Count 
2nd 
Most 
Likely 
CHEC 
Count 
3rd 
Most 
Likely 
CHEC 
Count 
Total 
Count 
CHEC23 - Unreliable 
instrumentation or equipment 
12 8 6 26 
CHEC8 - Monitoring numerous 
computer monitors or items 
12 6 4 22 
CHEC12 - Don't understand 
risk 
4 6 9 19 
CHEC26 - No way to keep 
track of progress 
4 6 5 15 
CHEC4 - Too easy to switch off, 
disable or incorrectly modify 
alerts, notifications or messages 
2 4 5 11 
CHEC3 - Too many alerts, 
notifications, messages 
2 1 4 7 
 
In terms of the most likely GISAT that would be affected by 
human error again the results were very clear with 224 of 
the 485 (46%) respondents stating that the most likely task 
that would be affected by human error would be entering, 
updating or deleting data within a system, file or document. 
Taking into account the most, second and third likely task to 
be affected then this was also the same GISAT and 
accounted for 331 (68%) responses. Interestingly the second 
most common GISAT for the most, second and third most 
likely and also the total of all responses was sending an 
email which accounted for 148 (31%) of all responses. The 
total responses related to the GISATs are presented in Table 
3. 
TABLE 3 
TOTAL GISATS 
GISAT Most 
Likely 
GISAT 
2nd 
Most 
Likely 
GISAT 
3rd 
Most 
Likely 
GISAT 
Total 
Count 
GISAT2 - Entering, updating 
or deleting data within a 
system, file or document 
224 72 35 331 
GISAT1- Sending an email 49 59 40 148 
GISAT5 - Administering a 
system 
47 49 35 131 
GISAT11 - Reading or 
checking an email, file, 
document or item 
31 41 45 117 
GISAT10 - Filing or sorting 
information 
21 39 23 83 
GISAT8 - Providing 
information verbally 
30 18 20 68 
GISAT3 - Posting an item or 
information 
14 20 22 56 
GISAT16 - Sharing or 
handing over information or 
equipment in person 
16 17 19 52 
GISAT9 - Delivering 
information or equipment 
20 13 17 50 
GISAT12 - Safeguarding 
information or equipment 
11 18 14 43 
GISAT4 - Configuring a 
system 
6 16 9 31 
GISAT14 – Accessing a 
location or environment 
5 3 9 17 
GISAT13 – Destroying 
information or equipment 
4 7 4 15 
GISAT6 - Scanning a 
document 
3 5 5 13 
GISAT7 - Printing a 
document 
3 4 2 9 
GISAT Most 
Likely 
GISAT 
2nd 
Most 
Likely 
GISAT 
3rd 
Most 
Likely 
GISAT 
Total 
Count 
GISAT15 – Faxing 
information 
1 2 3 6 
 
The respondents were also asked to suggest the RPMs that 
should be applied in order to reduce or avoid the current 
volumes of human error. Again the results were very clear 
in that the employees were suggesting greater focus to be 
placed on awareness and training. This was the most 
common response for the most, second and third most 
important suggested preventative measure and accounted for 
238 (49%) of all responses. The total responses related to 
the suggested preventative measures are presented in Table 
4. 
TABLE 4 
TOTAL RPMS 
Suggested Preventative 
Measure 
Most 
Suggested 
Preventative 
Measure 
2nd Most 
Suggested 
Preventative 
Measure 
3rd Most 
Suggested 
Preventative 
Measure 
Total 
Count 
RPM1 – Awareness and 
training undertaken 
(including 1:1) 
87 87 64 238 
RPM2 – Procedures 
documented and 
communicated 
35 49 31 115 
RPM4 – Recruitment of 
additional staff 
47 23 31 101 
RPM5 – Change to, 
simplification or 
standardisation of existing 
procedures, tools, systems or 
practices 
59 38 0 97 
RPM6 – Increased 
supervision or checks 
41 30 21 92 
RPM12 – Incentives 
introduced 
29 25 24 78 
RPM13 – Acquire and 
introduce new tools or 
technology 
25 23 16 64 
RPM7 – Change to 
communication methods 
24 22 18 64 
RPM16 – Eliminate or 
reduce distractions 
19 20 17 56 
RPM10 – Change to work 
patterns such as frequent 
breaks 
21 20 14 55 
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Suggested Preventative 
Measure 
Most 
Suggested 
Preventative 
Measure 
2nd Most 
Suggested 
Preventative 
Measure 
3rd Most 
Suggested 
Preventative 
Measure 
Total 
Count 
RPM8 – Risk assessment or 
audit undertaken and acted 
upon 
23 13 11 47 
RPM18 – Introduce 
warnings, alerts or alarms 
13 10 16 39 
RPM11 – Job rotation 19 11 9 39 
RPM15 – Split process and 
introduce segregation of 
duties 
8 11 10 29 
RPM3 – Simulation exercises 
performed 
4 11 9 24 
RPM14 – Introduce 
robotics/automation/artificial 
intelligence 
14 5 3 22 
RPM9 – Job description 
checked and updated 
7 3 7 17 
RPM20 – Reissue or resend 
information or equipment 
5 7 3 15 
RPM17 – Eliminate look-
and-sound-alikes 
2 4 2 8 
RPM19 – Recover, collect or 
destroy information or 
equipment 
3 3 2 8 
RPM0 – None needed 0 0 0 0 
RPM99 – Other non-human 
error related remedial and 
preventative measure 
0 0 0 0 
 
For each of the 9 organisational business areas within the 
participating organisation the questionnaire results were 
compared against IS-CHEC incident data and information 
security risk assessment reports captured since 01/03/2018. 
The incident data utilises the same IS-CHEC components. 
As the information security assessments, which were 
independent of this research, focussed on all aspects of 
information security and not solely human error the 
mapping of root cause analysis of findings was used. The 
participating organisation captured root causes as set out in 
Table 5. 
TABLE 5 
PARTICIPATING ORGANISATION ROOT CAUSE CATEGORIES 
Root Cause Categories 
RC1 – Human Error Slip or Lapse (Unintentional) 
RC2 – Human Factor (Intentional Act. E.g. hacking or non-
compliance with policy) 
RC3 – Technology Failure or Configuration 
RC4 – Procedural Mistake or failure 
RC5 - Physical Control Failure 
 
As presented in Table 6 a comparison of the questionnaire 
results were compared with past incident data and dedicated 
information security risk and compliance assessments that 
were undertaken for each of the 9 organisational business 
areas independent of this research. The analysis looked at 
the IS-CHEC questionnaire results and the recorded IS-
CHEC components for past information security incidents 
to see if there was a correlation related to those that were 
most commonly captured. The analysis of risk and 
compliance information security assessment reports looked 
at the selection of human error-related preventative 
measures for business areas and considered the percentage 
of human error-related information security incidents 
recorded since 01/03/2018. This comparison was 
undertaken with the participating organisation’s Information 
Security Manager and Information Security Incident 
Analyst. It was concluded by the Information Security 
Manager that in all 9 organisational business areas the IS-
CHEC questionnaire added value and addressed human 
error gaps within the risk and compliance assessment 
reports and approach due to the business context whereby 
the most common root cause of information security 
incidents is unintentional human error.  
TABLE 6 
COMPARISON OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS AGAINST PREVIOUSLY CAPTURED INCIDENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT DATA 
Business Area Correlation with Incident Data Comparison with Risk and Compliance Assessment 
Total 
CHEC 
Total 
GISAT 
Total 
RPM 
% Human 
Error 
Action Root Cause 
Focus 
IS-CHEC Questionnaire Added 
Value? 
A Yes Yes Yes 76% • RC1 – 0 
• RC2 – 5 
• RC3 – 2 
• RC4 – 6 
• RC5 – 4 
Yes 
B Yes Yes Yes 100% • RC1 – 1 
• RC2 – 1 
• RC3 – 0 
• RC4 – 4 
• RC5 - 2 
Yes 
C Yes Yes Yes 78% • RC1 – 1 
• RC2 – 5 
• RC3 – 1 
• RC4 – 2 
• RC5 - 4 
Yes 
D No Yes No 100% • RC1 – 0 
• RC2 – 2 
• RC3 – 3 
• RC4 – 1 
• RC5 - 2 
Yes 
E Yes Yes Yes 94% • RC1 – 0 Yes 
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Business Area Correlation with Incident Data Comparison with Risk and Compliance Assessment 
Total 
CHEC 
Total 
GISAT 
Total 
RPM 
% Human 
Error 
Action Root Cause 
Focus 
IS-CHEC Questionnaire Added 
Value? 
• RC2 – 3 
• RC3 – 2 
• RC4 – 1 
• RC5 - 7 
F Yes Yes Yes 91% • RC1 – 1 
• RC2 – 3 
• RC3 – 2 
• RC4 – 7 
• RC5 - 8 
Yes 
G Yes Yes Yes 88% • RC1 – 0 
• RC2 – 3 
• RC3 – 1 
• RC4 – 1 
• RC5 - 2 
Yes 
H No Yes Yes 92% • RC1 – 0 
• RC2 – 4 
• RC3 – 3 
• RC4 – 5 
• RC5 - 8 
Yes 
I No Yes Yes 97% • RC1 – 0 
• RC2 – 2 
• RC3 – 2 
• RC4 – 2 
• RC5 - 2 
Yes 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
The research has found that in the case of this particular 
case study and associated participating organisation, where 
it had already been established that human error accounted 
for the vast majority of reported information security 
incidents, that the use of the IS-CHEC technique proactively 
through a questionnaire added beneficial value as an 
enhancement to the standard approach of holistic risk 
assessment performed as part of compliance initiatives in 
conjunction with standards such as ISO27001 [52]. 
It was also possible to successfully convert the IS-CHEC 
questionnaire responses into risk exposure using the 
participating organisation’s risk management framework, 
associated matrices, and the analysis confirmed accurate 
reflection of the organisation’s risk position with regard to 
human error when compared to actual incident data. 
The questionnaire provided an employee perspective in that 
the participating organisation focus was primarily driven 
towards quantity rather than quality of task completion, 
which in turn commonly results in human error and 
associated information security incidents. These errors 
would likely materialise through entering data within 
systems or sending of emails. The employees also put 
forward that they require greater training and simplification 
of operating procedures.  
The research provides a view within this particular 
participating organisation that it was beneficial in all 9 
operational business areas to engage with staff directly to 
establish the actual organisational and contextual issues that 
could affect their ability to successfully complete intended 
work tasks and could result in information security 
incidents. Therefore, the information security community 
should look to adopt a mechanism for staff to freely provide 
them with the actual constraints to successful work task 
completion. This would enable the organisation to 
implement controls to reduce the proportions of human error 
and associated information security incidents and breaches.   
The research and the proactive use of the IS-CHEC 
technique in questionnaire form supports the approach taken 
by other questionnaires [47], [49] as outlined earlier within 
this paper. However, this research has shown that there are 
significant benefits in a specific focus on unintentional 
human error, links with HRA as used in the safety field, 
providing employees with the opportunity to suggest which 
systems and processes are most likely to be affected and the 
preventative measures which could reduce the likelihood of 
human error-related information security incidents 
occurring.   
The research was limited in that the CHECs offered to 
employees were restricted to those experienced by 
participating organisations within our wider research. The 
benefits were ease of questionnaire completion and higher 
response rates but this may have potentially prevented wider 
themes and patterns being unearthed.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, the research has confirmed that IS-CHEC in 
questionnaire form was successfully applied within a 
participating private sector healthcare organisation with a 
focus on information security. The technique delivered 
proactively to the people that are subject to human error 
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within an organisation can give them a voice in order to 
accurately steer their employer to recognise common 
organisational context that negatively affects their ability to 
perform required tasks successfully. 
The approach taken within this research shows the value of 
both introducing HRA as applied within the safety field and 
also, that a distributed approach for information security 
human error assessment can be successfully undertaken 
across a large organisation. This approach can add 
beneficial value to organisations as an enhancement to 
standard information security assessment approaches where 
it is known that the majority of information security 
incidents are as a result of human error. 
The results of this study show that organisational focus on 
its people and their working environment can improve 
information security understanding. This increased 
understanding would enable an organisation to subsequently 
decrease the volumes of associated information security 
incidents through a reduction in human error. As a result of 
this research the participating organisation was able to 
instigate a broad programme of improvement relating to 
training, standardisation of documented operating 
procedures, recruitment and health and wellbeing initiatives 
such as mindfulness sessions for all staff to attend.    
Future planned work includes the completion and 
publication of a 12 month real-time incident analysis 
empirical action research study across 2 participating public 
and private sector organisations to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the IS-CHEC information security human reliability 
analysis technique. The study, through intervention, is 
intended to gauge if the IS-CHEC technique when 
embedded within organisational practices can lead to a 
greater understanding of the causes and proportions of 
human error as well as reducing the volumes of human 
error-related information security incidents. 
APPENDIX  
A1 IS-CHEC Questionnaire Introductory 
Text  
[Redacted participating organisation name] is continuously 
working to improve our information governance and 
security practices to ensure the data we process is done so 
securely to protect the people whose data we process every 
day. 
We understand that the greatest asset to our organisation are 
our people and we want to ensure you are given the 
opportunity to tell us anonymously of areas where we may 
be able to offer you the best possible support in order to 
prevent future incidents from occurring. 
Therefore we would like you to complete the short 
questionnaire below. The questionnaire should take no 
longer than 5 minutes to complete and all answers will be 
treated in confidence. 
 
A2 IS-CHEC Questionnaire Data Capture Element  
TABLE A1 
IS-CHEC QUESTIONNAIRE DATA CAPTURE ELEMENT 
No. Question Description 
1 Which business area do you work in? This is a mandatory question using a drop-down list to select the business area the user works 
in. 
 
2 Most likely cause of human error? Please 
select the most likely potential causes of errors 
that could lead to information governance and 
security incidents whilst you are performing 
your work. 
This is a mandatory question using a drop-down list with randomly shuffled options to remove 
bias. Only the Core Human Error Causes (CHEC) that have been selected by participating 
organisations within our previous wider empirical research [21], [22] have been included in the 
options in order to reduce the options from 40 to 22. It was perceived during review with the 
private sector organisation that 40 options would be too much for the users and therefore this 
suggestion was made to the researcher. 
Also the text for each of the 22 CHECs was simplified as the private sector organisation felt 
that standard users would not fully understand the CHECs in there full format. 
 
3 How likely is this cause? This is a mandatory question. A simplified Likert scale is provided with 5 options with 
wording for each to make it easier for population. The 5 options is less granular that the IS-
CHEC incident analysis method (11 options) but it is felt that this would be sufficiently 
granular and the Microsoft Forms software only allowed a maximum of 7 options. The options 
are listed below. This could be adjusted for each organisation using their own risk 
quantification policy. 
0 - Not possible 
0.2 – Unlikely 
0.5 – Possible 
0.8 Highly likely 
1.0 Definitely will happen 
 
4 Second most likely cause of human error? 
(Optional) Please select the second most likely 
potential causes of errors that could lead to 
information governance and security incidents 
whilst you are performing your work. If there 
is not a second most likely cause of human 
error please select 'Not Applicable'. 
This is an optional question using a drop-down list which does not use randomly shuffled 
answers in order for the ‘Not Applicable’ option to be at the top for the ease of the user.  The 
same criteria have been applied as in question 2. 
If an option of ‘Not Applicable’ is selected then the questionnaire automatically skips to 
question 8. 
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No. Question Description 
5 How likely is this cause? This is an optional question. The same criteria has been applied as in question 2. 
 
6 Third most likely cause of human error? 
(Optional) Please select the third most likely 
potential causes of errors that could lead to 
information governance and security incidents 
whilst you are performing your work. If there 
is not a third most likely cause of human error 
please select 'Not Applicable'. 
This is an optional question using a drop-down list which does not use randomly shuffled 
answers in order for the ‘Not Applicable’ option to be at the top for the ease of the user.  The 
same criteria have been applied as question 2. 
If an option of ‘Not Applicable’ is selected then the questionnaire automatically skips to 
question 8. 
 
7 How likely is this cause? This is an optional question. The same criteria has been applied as in question 2. 
 
8 Most likely task affected? Please select the 
task that is most likely to be affected by the 
core human error causes you selected above.  
This is a mandatory question using a drop-down list with randomly shuffled options to remove 
bias. All 16 IS-CHEC General Information Security Affecting Tasks (GISAT) are presented to 
the user. 
 
9 Second most likely task affected? (Optional) 
Please select the task that is second most likely 
to be affected by the core human error causes 
you selected above. If there is not a second 
most likely task affected please select 'Not 
Applicable'. 
This is an optional question using a drop-down list which does not use randomly shuffled 
answers in order for the ‘Not Applicable’ option to be at the top for the ease of the user.  The 
same criteria have been applied as in question 8. 
If an option of ‘Not Applicable’ is selected then the questionnaire automatically skips to 
question 11. 
 
10 Third most likely task affected? (Optional) 
Please select the task that is third most likely to 
be affected by the core human error causes you 
selected above. If there is not a third most 
likely task affected please select 'Not 
Applicable'. 
This is an optional question using a drop-down list which does not use randomly shuffled 
answers in order for the ‘Not Applicable’ option to be at the top for the ease of the user.  The 
same criteria have been applied as question 8. 
If an option of ‘Not Applicable’ is selected then the questionnaire automatically skips to 
question 11. 
 
11 Most important suggested preventative 
measure? Please select a suggested 
preventative measure that you feel is most 
likely to help you and your colleagues to 
perform your work successfully and avoid 
errors that lead to information security 
incidents. 
This is a mandatory question using a drop-down list with randomly shuffled options to remove 
bias. All 20 IS-CHEC Remedial and Preventative Measures (RPM) are presented to the user. 
 
12 Second most important suggested preventative 
measure? (Optional) Please select a suggested 
preventative measure that you feel is second 
most likely to help you and your colleagues to 
perform your work successfully and avoid 
errors that lead to information security 
incidents. If there is not a second most 
important suggested preventative measure 
please select 'Not Applicable'. 
This is an optional question using a drop-down list which does not use randomly shuffled 
answers in order for the ‘Not Applicable’ option to be at the top for the ease of the user.  The 
same criteria have been applied as in question 11. 
If an option of ‘Not Applicable’ is selected then the questionnaire automatically skips to 
question 14. 
 
13 Third most important suggested preventative 
measure? (Optional) Please select a suggested 
preventative measure that you feel is third 
most likely to help you and your colleagues to 
perform your work successfully and avoid 
errors that lead to information security 
incidents. If there is not a third most important 
suggested preventative measure please select 
'Not Applicable'. 
This is an optional question using a drop-down list which does not use randomly shuffled 
answers in order for the ‘Not Applicable’ option to be at the top for the ease of the user.  The 
same criteria have been applied as question 11. 
If an option of ‘Not Applicable’ is selected then the questionnaire automatically skips to 
question 14. 
 
14 Most likely affected system or process? Please 
enter the system, process or activity that you 
feel would most likely be affected by human 
error and lead to an information governance 
and security incident from your area of work. 
Do not enter confidential personal data into the 
text box below. 
This is a mandatory short answer text box. The use of a short answer text box was due to both 
participating organisations not having a list of systems and processes or a list which would be 
understandable to all users. Also a short answer text box reduces the opportunity for 
confidential information to be added to the response form. In addition the note below is added 
to the question sub-title: 
Do not enter confidential personal data into the text box below. 
15 Second most likely affected system or process 
(Optional) Please enter the system, process or 
activity that you feel would second most likely 
be affected by human error and lead to an 
information governance and security incident 
from your area of work. Do not enter 
confidential personal data into the text box 
below. 
This is an optional short answer text box. The same criteria have been applied as question 14. 
 
16 Third most likely affected system or process 
(Optional) Please enter the system, process or 
activity that you feel would third most likely 
be affected by human error and lead to an 
information governance and security incident 
from your area of work. Do not enter 
confidential personal data into the text box 
below. 
This is an optional short answer text box. The same criteria have been applied as in question 
14. 
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A3 IS-CHEC Questionnaire Analysis Element 
TABLE A2 
IS-CHEC QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS ELEMENT 
Field Description 
Actual system or process? As the system or process field was a free text field it may have been misunderstood and the response may 
not have been an actual system or process. Therefore this field was added to enable this misinterpretations to 
be identified 
Nominal unreliability In-built HEART nominal unreliability associated with each GTT. 
There is no adaptation to this field.1 
Nominal unreliability lower 
bound 
In-built HEART nominal unreliability lowest value within the techniques range associated with each GTT.1  
Nominal unreliability upper 
bound 
In-built HEART nominal unreliability highest value within the techniques range associated with each GTT.1  
Most significant CHEC WoS 
decimal 
A field to remove the textual descriptor applied to options within the questionnaire Likert scale. The output 
is the numerical response. 
Most significant CHEC strength In-built HEART value/strength assigned to each EPC.1 
 
Second most significant CHEC 
WoS decimal 
A field to remove the textual descriptor applied to options within the questionnaire Likert scale. The output 
is the numerical response. 
Second most significant CHEC 
strength 
In-built HEART value/strength assigned to each EPC.1 
Third most significant CHEC 
WoS decimal 
A field to remove the textual descriptor applied to options within the questionnaire Likert scale. The output 
is the numerical response. 
Third most significant CHEC 
strength 
In-built HEART value/strength assigned to each EPC.1 
Primary CHEC assessed affect In-built HEART calculation establishing the effect of each identified HEART EPC which is referred to as a 
CHEC within the IS-CHEC technique.1  
Secondary CHEC assessed affect In-built HEART calculation establishing the effect of each identified HEART EPC which is referred to as a 
CHEC within the IS-CHEC technique.1  
Tertiary CHEC assessed affect In-built HEART calculation establishing the effect of each identified HEART EPC which is referred to as a 
CHEC within the IS-CHEC technique.1  
Nominal likelihood of failure Nominal probability that is employed to characterise the general likelihood of task failure based on the in-
built HEART calculation.1  
Nominal likelihood of failure 
lower bound 
Nominal lowest value probability based on the HEART ranges that are employed to characterise the general 
likelihood of task failure based on the in-built HEART calculation.1  
Nominal likelihood of failure 
upper bound 
Nominal highest value probability based on the HEART ranges that are employed to characterise the general 
likelihood of task failure based on the in-built HEART calculation.1  
Risk likelihood/probability Mapping of the Nominal likelihood of failure to the participating organisations quantified risk probability set 
within their risk appetite standard. 
Risk likelihood/probability lower 
bound 
Mapping of the Nominal likelihood of failure lower bound to the participating organisations quantified risk 
probability set within their risk appetite standard. 
Risk likelihood/probability upper 
bound 
Mapping of the Nominal likelihood of failure upper bound to the participating organisations quantified risk 
probability set within their risk appetite standard. 
Data classification Mapping to the participating organisations data classification standard to enable the risk impact to be 
established. 
Risk impact Mapping of the data classification to the participating organisations quantified risk impact set within their 
risk appetite standard. 
Risk score Establishing the numerical risk exposure as per the participating organisations quantified 4x4 risk scoring 
matrix set within their risk appetite standard. 
Level of risk exposure Mapping of the established numerical risk score to the qualitative terms used by the participating 
organisation as set within their risk appetite standard. 
Risk score lower bound Establishing the numerical risk lower bound exposure as per the participating organisations quantified 4x4 
risk scoring matrix set within their risk appetite standard. 
Level of risk exposure lower 
bound 
Mapping of the established numerical risk lower bound score to the qualitative terms used by the 
participating organisation as set within their risk appetite standard. 
Risk score upper bound Establishing the numerical risk upper bound exposure as per the participating organisations quantified 4x4 
risk scoring matrix set within their risk appetite standard. 
Level of risk exposure upper 
bound 
Mapping of the established numerical risk upper bound score to the qualitative terms used by the 
participating organisation as set within their risk appetite standard. 
																																								 																				
1 There is no adaptation to this field. 
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